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1 Introduction
General equilibrium models often produce dissimilar stylized facts about the effects of
monetary policy. It is therefore essential for both theorists and policy makers to learn
which model best represents each particular economy. In the last twenty years, a grow-
ing body of research has produced empirical evidence to improve the basis for model
selection. While great advances have been made within the closed-economy context, the
issue remains widely uncharted for open economies. The contemporaneous interaction
between the interest rate and the exchange has proved difficult to unravel. This paper
proposes a structural specification that extends Bernanke and Mihovs [6] identification
of the monetary policy innovation to account for the simultaneity between interest rate
and exchange rate innovations of open economies. Moreover, the methodology allows
for a separate treatment of two distinct monetary policies: open market operations and
foreign exchange market intervention.
Early attempts to identify monetary policy in open economies consisted in includ-
ing the exchange rate in a Vector Autoregression (VAR) in a simple, straightforward
way. Dynamic response functions were calculated assuming some type of Wold causal
ordering with the policy instrument typically allowed to have contemporaneous effects
on the exchange rate (Sims [37], Eichenbaum and Evans [16]). On inspection, this type
of identification strategies suffered from two inherent weaknesses. First, they implicitly
assumed that exchange rate innovations are not taken into account on impact by the
monetary authority when setting the stance of monetary policy, a claim very difficult
to credit. What is more, proceeding the other way around would be as unsatisfactory:
it would preclude the possibility of an impact effect of interest rate innovations on the
exchange rate (Kim and Roubini [21]). Second, these identification strategies also im-
plied that the exchange should be left out of consideration as a policy instrument per
se. Yet, a growing body of research investigates the monetary authorities’ participation
in foreign exchange markets as a policy device on its own (see, e.g., Sarno and Taylor
[34]).
Regarding the first shortcoming, a number of studies acknowledged the simultaneity
between current developments in the exchange rate and the interest rate (Grilli and
Roubini [17], Clarida and Gertler [11], Cushman and Zha [13], Kim and Roubini [21]).
However, none of them considered policy-making through interventions in the foreign
exchange market. On the contrary, in these studies monetary policy affects the ex-
change rate only indirectly, through its effect on what the authors consider the sole
policy instrument, such as money supply (Cushman and Zha [13]), or a short-term in-
terest rate (Grilli and Roubini [17], Clarida and Gertler [11], Kim and Roubini [21]).
Somewhat different than these approaches, Smets [39] claims for a more active role of
the exchange rate when measuring the stance of monetary policy. The monetary policy
shock simultaneously affects the exchange rate and the domestic short-term interest
rate. As a result, the depreciation rate contains valuable information about monetary
policy actions. However, while this makes the case for taking into account exchange
rate shocks to accurately measure monetary policy shocks, it still assumes that there
is only one policy shock. Since central banks in open economies operate through both
open market operations and interventions in the foreign exchange market, two different
sets of structural policy shocks should correspond to each of these actions.
Kim [20] is, in effect, the first author to attempt considering these two types of policy
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actions in a unifying empirical framework. The proposal consists in incorporating in a
structural VAR the Fed’s net purchases of foreign currency. However, the specification
fails to consider the private sector’s supply of, and demand for, foreign currency. Insofar
as identifying policy actions requires controling for policy reactions (Kim [20], p. 357),
it is essential to account for the market conditions that the monetary authority faces. In
fact, some of the empirical puzzles that the literature on monetary policy identification
has come across have been attributed to falling short in the task of separating supply
and demand (Leeper and Gordon [23]). For example, if the Fed purchases foreign cur-
rency amid a large current account deficit, the U.S. dollar would depreciate, whereas
such a depreciation is less plausible were there an excess of foreign currency due to a
current account surplus. What is so interesting about Bernanke and Mihov’s [6] iden-
tification strategy is the attempt to disentangle supply and demand pressures in the
market for bank reserves. By drawing on this simple idea, the methodology developed
in this paper considers both open market operations and foreign exchange interventions
as channels for monetary policy actions and reactions, while at the same time tackling
the simultaneity between interest rate and exchange rate innovations.
To test its performance, the proposed identification strategy is then applied to Ar-
gentina during 2003-2008, a small and open economy where the central bank was regu-
larly involved in open market operations and foreign exchange market intervention. In
addition to studying the effects of monetary policy innovations, the present study sheds
light on the endogenous component of monetary policy. The relatively low volatility
of Argentina’s exchange rate within the period covered in this paper, along with the
accumulation of large amounts of international reserves, could suggest another case of
“fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart [7]). The identification strategy to be outlined
below involves specifying the structural reaction function of the monetary authority.
As such, estimation of the parameters of this structural equation might provide a more
comprehensive measure than the ones of Calvo and Reinhart [7] on how closely the
operating procedure of the monetary authority resembles the one of a currency board
regime.
The main findings of this case study can be summarized as follows. Unexpected
purchases of foreign currency are systematically sterilized on impact, as the central
bank issues bonds to absorb around one-third of the domestic currency against which
the foreign exchange intervention takes place. The ensuing depreciation of the domestic
currency provides evidence of a portfolio balance channel. As a result of exchange rate
pass-through, inflation jumps after the shock, and the temporary increase in the rate
of output growth can thus be thought in terms of price misperception models. Finally,
while the real interest rate initially falls, it starts recovering around three months after
the shock as nominal interest rates increase. Unexpected open market operations affect
output growth with the expected sign, although it is not statistically significant at con-
ventional significance levels. The results also prove to be free of the empirical anomalies
previously found in the literature. There is no evidence of a liquidity puzzle; following
a contractionary policy shock, interest rates rise. In addition, the price puzzle is also
absent; inflation does not accelerate after the shock. Finally, the unexpected tightening
produces an impact appreciation of the domestic currency, and there are thus no signs
of an exchange-rate puzzle. Moreover, there is an ensuing depreciation of the domestic
currency which shows that there is no evidence of a forward discount bias puzzle. Re-
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garding the endogenous component of monetary policy, the paper finds that the central
bank has not absorbed balance of payments shocks in a currency-board fashion, as the
literature on fear of floating might suggest. The growing level of international reserves
can be rationalized, instead, as the monetary authority’s response to terms of trade,
supply and domestic currency demand shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below provides a simple characterization
of the problem of identifying structural VARs (SVARs). Section 3 develops an identi-
fication strategy that extends the Bernanke and Mihov’s [6] proposal to open-economy
settings, while section 4 puts forward the main caveats of this type of strategies. Sec-
tion 5 presents the application to the Argentine economy. Finally, section 6 contains
concluding remarks.
2 SVARs and the problem of identification
Here I will briefly outline the identification problem of SVARs. Formal treatments of
this subject can be found, among others, in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [9] and
Rubio-Ramı´rez, Waggoner and Zha [31].
A VAR(p) representation of a k-dimensional vector of economic variables, Zt, is
given by:
Zt = D1Zt−1 + . . .+DpZt−p + FXt + ut (1)
where ut is multivariate normal with Eutu′t = Σu and Eutu′s = 0 for all s 6= t, and Xt
is a vector of exogenous variables.
In this representation, contemporaneous relations between the variables in Zt are
implicitly allowed through ut. In particular, non-zero off-diagonal elements in Σu imply
such relations. Explicitly accounting for the latter demands a more comprehensive
representation than (1). The SVAR representation of the vector Zt is given by:
AZt = C1Zt−1 + . . .+ CpZt−p + EXt +Bvt (2)
which is usually referred to as the AB model (Amisano and Giannini [1]), as the relation
between reduced form residuals and structural shocks is given by Aut = Bvt. In (2),
any contemporaneous relation between the variables can be encompassed through the
off-diagonal elements of A and B. Then, as is customary, we can further assume without
loss of generality that the covariance matrix Σv of vt is diagonal.
It is useful to think about the reduced-form residuals u as “news” of the economy for
the current period. They are news relative to the history of the economy, as summarized
by the lagged values of the vector Z, and to the exogenous variables included in X.
Being news, these reduced-form residuals are observable. However, they are the result of
unobservable underlying (orthogonal) innovations that took place in the current period.
This unobservable innovations are the driving forces of the economy. Nevertheless, it
might well be the case that each one of these unobservable innovations leaves its track
in more than one of the observed “news.” To the extent that the cross-correlations of
the “news” are different from zero, the latter is certainly the case.
The problem of identification arises because the “news” in the economy can be
the result of different sets of underlying shocks. That is, different sets of structural
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parameters in (2) might yield the same observable parameters in (1). Consider a SVAR
model of the vector Zt that is different from the one in equation (2):
A˜Zt = C˜1Zt−1 + . . .+ C˜pZt−p + E˜Xt + B˜vt (3)
It is easy to prove that if there exists an k × k orthogonal matrix P such that A =
PA˜, Cj = PC˜j (1 ≤ j ≤ p), E = PE˜ and B = PB˜, then the structural models of
equations (2) and (3) are observationally indistinguishable from each other.1 That is,
both structural models yield the same reduced-form representation.
To see this, pre-multiply both sides of (2) by A−1 to obtain:
Zt = A−1C1Zt−1 + . . .+A−1CpZt−p +A−1EXt +A−1Bvt (4)
Since A = PA˜ and Cj = PC˜j , then A−1Cj = (PA˜)−1PC˜j = A˜−1P−1PC˜j = A˜−1C˜j . On
the other hand, since A = PA˜ and E = PE˜, then A−1E = (PA˜)−1PE˜ = A˜−1P−1PE˜ =
A˜−1E˜. As for the last term in equation (4), A = PA˜ and B = PB˜ imply that A−1B =
(PA˜)−1PB˜ = A˜−1P−1PB˜ = A˜−1B˜. Taken together, these results, which only require
P to be invertible, allow us to state that both structural models have reduced-form
representations with identical first moments. Consider then the second moments of the
reduced-form VAR of model (2):
Σu = A−1BΣvB′A′−1 (5)
Now, since A = PA˜ and B = PB˜, we have that
A−1BΣvB′A′−1 = A˜−1P−1PB˜ΣvB˜′P ′P ′−1A˜′−1 (6)
Orthogonality of P implies that the RHS of (6) reduces to A˜−1B˜ΣvB˜′A˜′−1 = Σ˜u, and
so Σu = Σ˜u.
A SVAR is said to be globally identified if the only such orthogonal matrix P is the
identity matrix. If this is the case, then there is only one set of structural parameters
that can be deduced from the estimation of the reduced-form VAR. For a model to be
identified, it is necessary to impose restrictions on its parameters. Thus, the task of the
structural VAR literature consists in finding an appealing story that establishes how
the underlying shocks build up to the observed news. One can think of two general
principles to follow when building such a story. First, it must be so parsimonious as to
provide enough restrictions for the model to be identified. The necessary and sufficient
conditions for identification upon this paper relies are the ones given in Rubio-Ramı´rez
et al. [31]. Second, and not less important, the identification strategy should not rest
on any particular theoretical model. Otherwise, it would not be possible to provide a
neutral “arena within which macroeconomic theories confront reality and thereby each
other” (Sims [36]).
By far the most popular identification strategy consists in ordering the endogenous
variables by their degree of “exogeneity.” This allows the researcher to rest on the
uniqueness of the Cholesky factorization, so that only one possible structural model
can be behind a certain reduced-form covariance matrix. With the years, more sophis-
ticated strategies where developed, allowing to deal with models where the claim of a
1Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. [31], p. 6, prove that the converse is also true.
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Wold causal ordering could not be sustained.
The first building block of the identification strategy to be developed in the present
study consists in representing the economy with two sub-vectors of variables that to-
gether conform the vector Zt of endogenous variables: Yt denotes the l × 1 vector of
variables of the production sector, whereas the (k−l)×1 vector Pt includes the variables
of the transactions sector of the economy.2
Bernanke and Blinder [3] argue that there are two alternative assumptions that facil-
itate identification. Namely, one could assume either that there is no contemporaneous
feedback from the production sector to the transactions sector or that shocks within
the transaction sector do not affect the production sector contemporaneously. In both
cases, A becomes a block triangular matrix and B a block diagonal matrix. The ap-
proach here follows Bernanke and Mihov [6], who assume that shocks in the transaction
sector do not affect the production sector within the current period. In other words, we
assume a sluggish production sector that responds to innovations in the transactions
sector only with a lag (see, e.g., Kim [20]). If
Zt =
[
Yt
Pt
]
(7)
then we have that
A =
[
A11 0
A21 A22
]
(8)
B =
[
B11 0
0 B22
]
(9)
where A11 and B11 are of size l × l, A21 is of size (k − l) × l, and A22 and B22 are of
size (k− l)× (k− l). I will assume that A11 is lower triangular, and that B11 is an l× l
identity matrix,3 leaving the parameters in A21 unrestricted. Additionally, all equations
will appear normalized using the corresponding dependent variable as numeraire.
With the aforementioned restrictions, it is still necessary to understand the con-
temporaneous relations between the variables included in the transactions sector of the
economy, encompassed in A22 and B22, in order to achieve identification. The next
section presents an identification strategy that successfully deals with this task.
3 Identification in open economies: extending the Ber-
nanke-Mihov approach
Instead of focusing directly on the interest rate and the exchange rate, this paper
presents an identification scheme that builds on the items in the balance sheet of the
monetary authority. In their analysis for the US economy, Bernanke and Mihov [6]
2Even when the taxonomy adopted here might be misleading, it seems more appropriate in the present
case than the nomenclature usually adopted in the literature. Bernanke and Blinder [3] label the former
the “nonpolicy variables,” and the latter the “policy variables.” In the model to be constructed below,
however, Pt includes variables that are far from being controlled by the monetary authority.
3I have assumed that the structural shocks are orthogonal, but not necessarily of unit variance.
Other authors assume that the structural shocks have unit variance, and instead leave the elements on
the diagonal of B unrestricted.
6
focus only on the items of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet that link the monetary
authority with the commercial banks, namely, borrowed and nonborrowed reserves. Un-
derstanding the context in which central banks in open economies carry out monetary
policy calls for bringing into the analysis the evolution of international reserves.
Table 1 below presents the balance sheet of the central bank in an open economy,
with its components coveniently grouped for the purposes of the present study.
Table 1. The Balance Sheet of the Central Bank in an Open Economy
Assets Liabilities and Net worth
Net foreign assets (nfa) Currency held by the public (cp)
Commercial banks’ domestic liquidity (li)
Central Bank Bonds (mp)
Other items, net (oi)
With the definitions provided in Table 1, it is straightforward to see that the follow-
ing accounting identity in VAR-innovation form holds at any given point in time:
unfa = ucp + uli + ump + uoi (10)
As long as the terms of trade and domestic prices are included in the nonpolicy
block of the VAR, and under the identifying assumption that the latter two affect
contemporaneously the policy block (which will then require no reverse feedback), it is
then possible to argue that the reference interest rate, the discount rate and the selected
exchange rate are the only remaining price variables affecting the quantities in equation
(10).
One-step-ahead forecast errors for each of these prices enter the innovation-form
equations describing the markets for each of the items in the central bank’s balance
sheet. Following the literature, it is assumed that the innovation to the discount rate is
zero. Given the interest in solving for the remaining two prices in terms of the underlying
structural shocks, two equilibrium conditions are needed. In other words, we need an
additional equilibrium condition besides the one provided by the monetary authority’s
balance sheet. Actually, relying on only one equilibrium condition led Bernanke and
Mihov [6], who initially consider both the fed funds rate and the discount rate, to make
the simplifying assumption that the innovation to the discount rate is zero.4 For its
crucial relevance in the determination of the exchange rate in general and its decisive
influence on the monetary conditions faced by the economy in the particular case under
study, the external sector conservation condition seems the most appropriate identity to
overcome this obstacle. Therefore, the additional equilibrium condition proposed here
is the balance of payments.
Note, however, that while the balance of payments summarizes the flows of funds
between the country and the rest of the world, the balance sheet of the monetary
authority, as any other balance sheet, provides information on stocks. Considering the
first difference of the above balance-sheet items, then equation (10) turns into:
u∆nfa = u∆cp + u∆li + u∆mp + u∆oi (11)
4In the 1995 NBER version of their article, Bernanke and Mihov [5] explore the effects of considering
nonzero discount rate innovations by including an additional reaction function for the Federal Reserve.
Insofar as neither the reference short-term interest rate nor the exchange rate are variables unilaterally
decided by the policy maker, such a shortcut is not at hand in the present study.
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On the other hand, turning to the balance of payments, the following conservation
condition holds for the residuals of a VAR that includes the external accounts of any
given country:
u∆nfa = uca + uka (12)
where u∆nfa is the forecast error of the change in net foreign assets also included in
equation (11), uca is the residual corresponding to the current account, and uka is the
error attached to capital and financial accounts’ transactions excluding the flows affect-
ing the central bank’s foreign-currency liabilities,5 since the latter are included within
net foreign assets. In other words, the claim is that fluctuations in international re-
serves are relevant for the behaviour of the other variables of the VAR to the extent
that they do not have as an exact counterpart adjustments in items denominated in
foreign currency in the central bank’s balance sheet. In the event of a positive shock to
the current account, this could imply, for instance, an increase in seignoriage affecting
u∆cp, later possibly sterilized through u∆mp.
It is essential to rely on a structural VAR system to know in which precise sense the
observable VAR innovations in equations (11)-(12) relate to the “primitive” orthogo-
nalized shocks v, and therefore be able to recover (i.e., observe) the latter to trace their
effects on the economy. The following simple model parsimoniously accounts for the
behaviour of the external sector of the economy and the markets for the items in the
central bank’s balance sheet:
uca = βuer + vca (13)
uka = ρuir − δuer + vka (14)
u∆nfa = φcavca + φkavka + v∆nfa (15)
u∆cp = −γuir − τuer + v∆cp (16)
u∆li = −η(uir − udr) + ωuer + v∆li (17)
u∆mp = θ∆cpv∆cp + θ∆liv∆li + θ∆nfau∆nfa + v∆mp (18)
u∆oi = ψ∆nfav∆nfa + ψ∆cpv∆cp + ψ∆liv∆li + ψ∆mpv∆mp + v∆oi (19)
where uir, udr and uer stand for the innovations in the reference interest rate, the dis-
count rate, and the selected exchange rate measure, respectively.
Equation (13) puts forward the behaviour of the current account. It states that in-
novations in current account flows depend positively on the exchange rate and a foreign-
currency supply disturbance operating through the current account. The exchange rate
response is justified by the behaviour of the trade balance in goods and services.
Equation (14) relates innovations in the capital and financial account (as defined
above) to innovations in the reference interest rate, the exchange rate, and an au-
tonomous shock. While the domestic interest rate is expected to affect positively the
capital and financial account, the sign of the effect of the exchange rate is less clear.
On the one hand, an unexpected depreciation could make the country more attractive
for foreign direct investors. On the other hand, an unexpected depreciation might lead
to a contraction in the demand for domestic currency, with the corresponding flight to
5In the Argentine case below, for example, checking accounts in foreign currency and obligations
with IFIs.
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quality. The latter effect probably dominates the former one, for it seems reasonable to
think that FDI decisions are based on longer-term conditions rather than on monthly
forecast errors.
Equation (15) captures the behaviour of the central bank regarding the external
sector of the economy, indicating how the monetary authority responds to the develop-
ments of the market for foreign currency. According to (15), the central bank observes
and responds to the contemporaneous foreign currency supply (or demand if negative)
shocks.6 The strength of the response is given by the coefficients φca and φka. For
example, under a currency board regime, the central bank provides all the currency
(foreign or domestic, depending on the case) that the external sector needs at every
point in time at the fixed exchange rate. This amounts to the identifying assumption
that φca = φka = 1.
Equation (16) is the currency demand function of the public. It states that interest
rate and exchange rate innovations affect negatively the change in the public’s holdings
of domestic currency. The expected relation with the exchange rate addresses the afore-
mentioned aspect regarding the confidence in the domestic currency in the event of an
unexpected depreciation.
Equation (17), in turn, is the liquidity demand by commercial banks, expressed in
innovation form. As in Bernanke and Mihov [6], we will relate this variable to the ref-
erence interest rate and the discount rate. I expect the change in liquidity to depend
negatively on the difference between the reference interest rate (the rate at which liquid-
ity can be lent in the market) and the discount rate (the rate at which the central bank
offers to withhold the liquidity). Consistent with the assumed relation between the ex-
change rate and the demand for domestic currency by the public, the positive relation
between the change in liquidity and exchange rate innovations captures the precau-
tionary liquidity hoarding commercial banks might incur when facing an unanticipated
depreciation, thereby preparing themselves for potentially large deposit withdrawals.
Finally, v∆li is a disturbance to the liquidity function.
Equation (18) describes the behaviour of the monetary authority in the markets
where transactions denominated in local currency take place. That is, I assume that
the central bank observes and responds to both public and commercial banks’ contem-
poraneous liquidity shocks. Furthermore, the central bank reacts to the result of its own
contemporaneous intervention in the foreign exchange market, u∆nfa. For example, a
central bank absorbing all the excess supply of foreign currency in an economy with a
large external surplus (thereby avoiding an exchange rate appreciation) might at the
same time decide to sterilize the domestic currency that it deems to be in excess of
the transactionary requirements of the economy. In such a situation, one should expect
θ∆nfa to be close to one.
Last, equation (19) shows that the remaining items in the central bank’s balance
sheet are allowed to be contemporaneously affected by the developments in net foreign
assets, currency held by the public, commercial bank’s liquidity and the net bonds’
holdings of the central bank. In this sense, these items are assumed to be the most
endogenous ones, accomodating to the resulting interaction of the main monetary ag-
6In Argentina, all foreign-exchange transactions are made through the central bank, and so the
assumption that it observes these shocks is straightforwardly sustained in the example to be carried out
below.
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gregates.
Following the literature, the innovation to the discount rate udr is assumed to be
zero. Therefore, equations (11) and (12) allow to solve the system (13)-(19) in terms
of innovations to the current account, change in net foreign assets, change in currency
held by the public, change in liquidity, change in central bank’s net bonds holdings, the
reference interest rate and the exchange rate measure. In matrix form, the system that
involves A22 and B22 becomes7:
1 0 0 0 0 0 −β
−1 1 0 0 0 −ρ δ
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 γ τ
0 0 0 1 0 η −ω
0 −θ∆nfa 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 −1 −1 −1 0 0


uca
u∆nfa
u∆cp
u∆li
u∆mp
uir
uer

=

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
φca 1 0 0 0 φka 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 θ∆cp θ∆li 1 0 0
0 ψ∆nfa ψ∆cp ψ∆li ψ∆mp 0 1


vca
v∆nfa
v∆cp
v∆li
v∆mp
vka
v∆oi

(20)
While section 2 emphasized the fact that the observable error terms come as a result
of the underlying structural shocks, it is now of interest to see how this unobservables
forces could be empirically deduced from the former observable forecast errors. It follows
from the previous discussion that in the open-economy setting under study we have not
only one, but two simultaneous monetary policy shocks. One of them operates in the
foreign exchange market, where the central bank also reacts to the demand for domestic
and foreign currency. The other one can be found by appropriately filtering the one-
step-ahead forecast error for the change in the central bank’s net bonds holdings from
the result of the external sector and the policy reaction to the public and commercial
bank’s liquidity demand shocks.8 From (20) it is easy to see that:
v∆nfa = (φka − φca)uca + (1− φka)u∆nfa
+ρφkauir + (βφca − δφka)uer (21)
v∆mp = −θ∆nfau∆nfa − θ∆cpu∆cp − θ∆liu∆li
+u∆mp − (ηθ∆li + γθ∆cp)uir + (θ∆liω − τθ∆cp)uer (22)
Unsurprisingly, under the currency board example (φca = φka = 1) neither the
7Appendix A shows that the model satisfies both the necessary order condition for identification
and, based on Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. [31], a sufficient rank condition for global identification.
8Note that while for the U.S. monetary policy is often associated with innovations in the monetary
target (i.e. the Fed Funds rate), Schabert [35] also proposes to identify monetary policy via changes in
open market operations.
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current account nor the capital account forecast errors play any role whatsoever when
deducing the monetary policy shock on the external sector. In this case, this policy
shock becomes v∆nfa = ρuir + (β − δ)uer. On the other hand, to the extent that the
monetary authority reacts to contemporaneous shocks to its balance sheet (i.e., θ∆j
for some j = cp, li, nfa), to obtain the local-currency policy shock it is necessary to
consider the news provided by additional forecast errors other than u∆mp itself.
4 Caveats
The above proposal for identification is subject to a number of criticisms that should not
stay unmentioned. The most popular one comes as a response to Sims’ [36] arguments
against non-credible identification restrictions. A common interpretation of Sims’ article
is that the fear of placing the wrong restrictions should be enough incentive to leave the
model as unrestricted as possible. In the present case, we have a reduced-form covariance
matrix that will provide us with k(k+1)2 = 55 different restrictions, while we have only
49 unknown parameters (39 coefficients and 10 variances, one for each orthogonalized
shock). Thus, it can be argued that, by dropping some of the restrictions, we would
have an overall more credible identification structure.9
A more profound critique, nonetheless largely neglected in most of the literature, is
the one that warns about the implications of forward-looking behavior for the credibility
of zero restrictions as identification assumptions. The decision rules of forward-looking
economic agents depend on the subjective conditional probability distributions that
sthey have regarding what is unknown to them of the future. Thus, we are likely to face
a misspecified equation if, after asserting that agents form their expectations conditional
on all available information, we state, for instance, that contemporaneous changes in
net foreign assets do not affect decisions that are eventually reflected in the capital
account. On the contrary, the literature on currency crises that starts with Krugman
[22] is precisely concerned with agents minding the level of international reserves in
order to decide their domestic/foreign currency holdings.
Interestingly, Sims [36] himself stressed how “deeply subversive of identification” (p.
7) the rational expectations hypothesis is, even though later in that same article he
turned to zero restrictions for identification. Since dealing with all of his critiques at
once was “a [research] program which is so challenging as to be impossible in the short
run” (Sims [36], p. 11), it is possible to justify Sims procedure as a first step towards
improved estimation of macroeconomic models. The first caveat mentioned above can
indeed be better understood from this perspective. As long as each additional zero
restriction is regarded as a further departure from appropriately accounting for forward-
looking behavior, one should leave as many parameters unrestricted as possible.10 This
leads to the conclusion that it is not overidentification per se that should be frown
upon, but overidentification through zero restrictions. If, on the contrary, forward-
looking behavior is appropriately accounted for, then whether the structural model is
9Of course, the counting exercise above leads only to a necessary condition for identification. It
does not follow, then, that by dropping any one of the restrictions identification would necessarily be
preserved.
10It is not surprising, then, that Sims [36] uses the just-identified Cholesky factorization.
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overidentified or not ceases to be an issue.11
A number of reasons support overidentification in the present case. The first one
relates to the appropriate procedure for selecting which restriction to drop. Christiano
et al. [9] have criticized Bernanke and Mihov’s [6] test for selecting among different
identification schemes, which consists in imposing an additional, maintained, restriction,
to then use standard likelihood ratio methods for testing the alternative identification
assumptions. Christiano et al. [9] point that, unless there are “overwhelimingly sharp
priors” that support the maintained restriction, these procedure is not useful.
Second, there is a pragmatical advantage derived from using an overidentified model.
Based on the bootstrap confidence intervals of the impulse response functions, it is
possible to learn how much information the data provide for unveiling the effects of the
structural shocks. The smaller the sample size, the more difficult it is to accurately
estimate the effects of a certain shock, even more so for those shocks that explain only
a small portion of the variability in the data (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson
[10]).12 Overidentification allows to narrow bootstrap confidence intervals in spite of
having a relatively small sample.
Additional pitfalls in the VAR literature come from the fact that the information set
the econometrician assigns to the central banker does not match their actual information
set. In fact, it is possible to argue that neither of these sets is included in the other one.
On the one hand, the block diagonal structure adopted here implies that the monetary
authority observes and responds to final, revised data on terms of trade, output and
prices. Rudebusch [32] shows that if data revisions by statistical agencies do more
than simply adding noise to the preliminary figures, then by the classic result from
the errors-in-variables model, estimates of the parameters in the monetary authority’s
reaction function are biased.13 The problem with the opposite ordering, however, is
that certain behavioral equations become certainly controversial. For instance, with the
transactions block ordered first, money demand cp would not have current output or
prices as arguments.
On the other hand, the decision maker is likely to react to variables not included in
the econometrician’s data set, such as the trade balance, the stance of fiscal policy and
political pressures (Khoury [19], cit. in Rudebusch [32]). Doubts cast on the estimated
reaction functions due to this type of concerns has led several authors to focus on the
dynamic response of the system to the estimated shocks rather than on the estimated
systematic component of monetary policy (Sims [38], Christiano et al. [9]).
In his critique to VAR measures of monetary policy, Rudebusch [32] also emphasizes
the possibility of misspecification due to the use of a linear structure in the monetary
authority’s reaction function. This could be the case if the policy reaction function is
a nonlinear function of the information set of the policy-maker, or if the decision rule
of the latter involves moving the policy instrument by discrete amounts (Eichenbaum
11The most appropriate alternative to zero restrictions goes back to Sargent [33], who estimates a
permanent-income model with cross-equations restrictions. This notwithstanding, it has been argued
that the type of short-run restrictions used here seems to be the most appropriate to identify two type
of policies (Kim, [20], p. 357).
12Once detected, there are no solutions for large confidence intervals but to “impose additional in-
dentifying restrictions (i.e., use more theory) or obtain better data” (Christiano at al. [10], p. 40).
13For an empirical analysis of the importance of data revisions using U.S. data, see Croushore and
Evans [12].
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and Evans [16]). This type of misspecification is not investigated here, both because it
would not be clear the precise source of nonlinearity (Eichenbaum and Evans [16]), and
because a linear model could provide accurate results even when the structure of the
economy is nonlinear (Sims [38]).
5 Measuring monetary policy in Argentina
To evaluate its performance, this section applies the methodology developed in section
3 to the case of Argentina. The first subsection presents the variables included in the
model and the specification to be used. The second subsection presents and discusses
the estimation results.
5.1 Data and specification
Estimation is conducted employing monthly data from 2003:4 through 2008:9.14 Based
on the discussion of the previous sections, the variables in the VAR are constructed
according to the following description. All stocks are as of the end of the corresponding
period.
• Terms of trade growth (tot). Monthly variation of the terms of trade index, inter-
polated from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) statistics
(see Appendix B).
• Output growth (g). Monthly variation of the seasonally-adjusted real gross domes-
tic product, interpolated from INDEC national accounts statistics (see Appendix
B).
• Inflation (p). Monthly variation of the GDP deflator, monthly series, interpolated
from INDEC national accounts statistics (see Appendix B).
• Net foreign assets (nfa) consists of gross international reserves net of checking
accounts in foreign currency and obligations with IFIs.
• Current account (ca) data were collected from the foreign exchange market statis-
tics of the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina (BCRA henceforth, by its
initials in Spanish).15 The series is expressed in Pesos using the average reference
exchange rate released by the BCRA.
14Argentina abandoned its currency-board regime on January 6, 2002. I leave 2002 and the first
months of 2003 out of the sample because of the turmoil affecting the financial system during that
period.
15The data come from the “Mercado U´nico Libre de Cambios”. There are multiple reasons that justify
this decision, among them the fact that the balance of payments computes trade in goods at the time of
embarkment while the exchange market computes it when the foreign-currency transaction is liquidated,
and because the latter is calculated on a cash basis rather than on a accrued basis, and thus appropriately
captures the transactions that influence the exchange rate within each period of time. Fortunately,
foreign exchange market statistics are available at a monthly frequency (as opposed to the quarterly data
provided by National Accounts statistics). For the differences between the balance of payments statistics
released by the Direction of National Accounts and the data used here from the foreign exchange
market elaborated by the BCRA, see http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/estadistica/diferencias.pdf
(in Spanish).
13
• Currency held by the public (cp) includes both Pesos and quasi-monies held by
the public, seasonally adjusted. Quasi-moneis, which rescue finished in March
2004, had been issued by different provinces since 2001. By including them within
cp, however, we are assuming that they constitute a (contingent) liability of the
central bank.
• Bonds (mp) includes only BCRA Peso-denominated bonds. Peso-denominated
bonds issued by Argentina’s Treasury held by BCRA are set aside from this def-
inition, since variations in this item could well respond both to quantities (open
market operations) or prices, and the latter are particularly volatile for the country
under study. Thus, Public bonds in Table 1 go within other items.
• Commercial banks’ liquidity (li) includes checking accounts in Pesos at BCRA,
domestic currency held by banks (i.e., cash in vaults), and reverse repos net of (i)
repos and (ii) iliquidity rediscounts.16
• The interest rate (ir) is the average interest rate for loans between domestic fi-
nancial institutions (period average) released by BCRA.
• The exchange rate (er) is BCRA’s reference exchange rate (period average).
Since identification in (20) is achieved by exploiting linear relationships, it is not
possible to resort to log levels for normalization (Strongin [40]). Monetary stock vari-
ables and ca are therefore normalized by the lag of a 36-month moving average of cp.17
Normalized series are plotted in Figure 4 (Appendix C).
Specification tests are presented in Appendix C. In a nutshell, the AIC suggests one
should prefer the model with three lags to the one with two lags, and the latter to the
one with only one lag, while based on the other information criteria the preference re-
lation is reversed. The model with two lags should be preferred in terms of compliance
with both the assumption of no serial autocorrelation and of normality of the residuals.
On the contrary, these two assumptions and the one of homoskedasticity seem to be
violated in the specification wih only one lag. On the other hand, the VAR(3) specifi-
cation conforms slightly better to homoskedasticity than the VAR(2). In light of these
considerations, we are inclined to present the results obtained with the model with two
lags. For the sake of robustness, however, all estimates presented here were compared
16Note that the supply of net reverse repos is not taken into account within mp. Behind this choice
stands the claim that the supply of net reverse repos is perfectly elastic, their quantity being determined
solely by the demand of commercial banks. It must be noted, however, that this is not justified on the
grounds of there being ‘implicit costs’ (Nakashima [27]) in discount-window borrowing that discourage
commercial banks from borrowing infinite quantities when the discount rate is below short-term interest
rates. Contrary to the case of the United States, for the period under analysis commercial banks in
Argentina were net discount-window lenders to the monetary authority. The underlying assumption
is, then, that the fact that the BCRA passively accommodates to the excess liquidity the banks wish
to collocate in reverse repos in the short run. The same reasoning applies to Iliquidity rediscounts,
which were a major source of liquidity during the first years of the period under analysis, when they
were used to face the deposit withdrawals that followed the pesification of the latter. While the BCRA
had established a schedule for the cancellation of these rediscounts, the bulk of them was cancelled in
advance of that schedule.
17Strongin [40], Bernanke and Mihov [6] and others normalize U.S. data by a moving average of total
reserves. In the present study, the closest analogue of total reserves is li. However, this last variable
remains negative until 2004.
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to the ones of the model with three lags. These were not not qualitatively different from
the ones presented here, and are available from the author upon request.18
5.2 Estimation and results
The structural model is estimated via full information maximum likelihood. 95 %
confidence intervals for impulse response functions are computed using the bootstrap
procedure described in Christiano et al. [9],19 represented by the dashed lines in the
figures to be introduced below.
5.2.1 What happens after both monetary policy shocks?
Figure 1 presents the response of the different variables to monetary policy shocks. A re-
markable dynamic feature produced by the estimated SVAR regarding foreign exchange
intervention is that the central bank’s unexpected purchase of foreign currency is not
even nearly mirrored by an increase in the monetary base on impact. And this fact can
only be partially explained by the systematic sterilization component of the interven-
tion: on impact the central bank absorbs only one third of the shock (33.8%, nearly
significant at the 5% level). It follows then that some of the components within “Other
items, net” (oi, see Table 1) must necessarily be affected by this shock. Notably, this
might mean that the unexpected foreign exchange purchase partially corresponds itself
with the reduction of a Treasury liability to the central bank (a central bank asset). It
is possible to think of a situation in which, upon running a surplus, the Treasury cancels
transitory advances lent by the monetary authority, to then have the latter purchasing
foreign currency so that the monetary base remains unaffected (as the fiscal surplus
was raised from the private sector in the first place). This would open the way to the
possibility, unexplored in the literature, that monetary policy shocks be indeed partially
driven by fiscal shocks.20
The foreign exchange intervention shock causes a depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency. For the most part, this observed depreciation can be explained by the systematic
sterilization of intervention. According to portfolio balance models, the increase in
Peso-denominated assets in the portfolio of the private sector requires a fall in the price
18With T = 66, we are left with only 43 and 32 degrees of freedom in the VAR(2) and VAR(3)
specifications, respectively. This notwithstanding, Bernanke and Mihov [6] rely on a similar amount
of degrees of freedom for their short sub-sample 1988-1996. Their 100-observations sample is further
reduced because of using a maximum lag of 11. The remaining 89 observations are used to estimate a
VAR with an intercept and lags 1 to 6, 8, 10, and 11. This leaves them with as many as 34 degrees of
freedom, notably lower than the ones left in other sub-samples, ranging from 100 to 305 for the whole
sample, although parameter stability is a problem when the whole sample is used (see Bagliano and
Favero [2]).
19First, the following procedure is repeated 200 times: (i) from the residuals of the estimated model,
draw a random sample of size equal to the sample size T , with replacement; (ii) based on this new set of
residuals, construct the series included in the model using the estimated coefficients and the historical
initial conditions; (iii) then re-estimate the VAR using this artificially generated sample, and calculate
its IRFs. Then, for each lag, order the 200 impulse responses from smallest to largest. The lower and
upper boundaries are the corresponding percentiles in this ordering. See Christiano et al. [9], p. 22,
footnote 23.
20Of course, one could also think of a central bank demanding resources from the Treasury to enable
the latter to buy foreign currency. The question of whether there is fiscal or monetary dominance clearly
raises an identification issue.
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Figure 1: What happens after both monetary policy shocks?
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of these assets relative to the price of foreign assets (e.g., Obstfeld [28], Dominguez and
Frankel [14]).21 This would induce the persistent depreciation observed in the estimated
impulse-response function, there also being evidence of a mild overshooting during the
first few months after the impact. On the contrary, the evidence here rejects the pos-
sibility that the exchange rate depreciation is ultimately grounded on the unexpected
purchase of foreign currency conveying a signal of a less tight monetary policy in the
future (e.g., Lewis [25], Kaminsky and Lewis [18], Payne and Vitale [29]). If that were
the case, then the central bank should systematically pursue expansionary open market
operations some time after the impact. However, the estimated model shows how this
policy reaction is far from being statistically significantly different from zero one month
after the impact, to then rapidly die out.
While the literature on foreign exchange intervention has traditionally been con-
fined to the question on whether or not it is effective in influencing exchange rates (see,
e.g., Sarno and Taylor [34]), the present analysis is wider in its scope.22 It is thus
possible to gauge the effects of this type of monetary policy shock on the rest of the
economy. In that regard, the estimated model features a significant, temporary accel-
eration in inflation one month after the impact, alongside a temporary increment in
the rate of growth. The jump in the inflation rate can be rationalized straighforwardly
as exchange-rate pass-through. Interestingly, the response of output is thus consistent
with Lucas’ [30] model of price misperceptions, a transmission mechanism largely dis-
carded in studies using U.S. data and which focus on only one possible policy shock
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [8]). Finally, while the real interest rate initially
falls, it starts recovering around three months after the shock as nominal interest rates
increase.
As for the effects of the other monetary policy shock, an unexpected open market
operation produces a significant slowdown in the rate of terms of trade growth. This
fact reappears here as surprisingly as was first found out by Sims [37].23 The response
of output growth, on the other hand, is of the expected sign, although it is not sta-
tistically significant at conventional significance levels.24 The contractionary monetary
policy shock also produces an increase in interest rates, consequently there being no
evidence of a liquidity puzzle (Leeper and Gordon [23]). In addition, the shock has no
significant effects on the price level. That inflation does not accelerate after the contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock indicates that the identification strategy also overcomes
21For this to be true, the private sector should not be providing foreign currency to the Argentine
central bank by selling foreign bonds. If that were the case, there would be no excess demand for foreign
currency in the event of a fully sterilized intervention. The argument above thus rests on the assumption
that Argentine and non-Argentine assets are not perfect substitutes.
22An exception in the theoretical literature is Vitale [41], who proposes a model with foreign exchange
intervention as a signalling device that, in equilibrium, reduces the volatility of the employment level.
23Upong finding that a contractionary monetary policy shock reduces commodity prices in all but
one of the countries studied, Sims argues that “[t]he only caveat is that it is perhaps surprising that
four of these five countries’ monetary policies could all independently have such strong influences on a
single international commodity price index.” (op. cit., p. 988)
24In the model with three lags, which impulse-response functions are not reported here, one and two
months after the monetary policy shock output growth does fall significantly. The point estimate of
the slowdown is of −0.79% and −0.72% annualized, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for the
deceleration one month after the perturbation indicates that output growth is estimated to fall from
0.1% to 1.5% annualized. This model also displays a bounce-back effect in output growth around 5
months after the shock.
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the price puzzle (Sims [37], Eichenbaum [15]). That there is no evidence of the shock
generating deflationary pressures, on the other hand, suggests that the deceleration in
output growth could be rationalized by sticky-prices or limited participation models
(Christiano et al. [8]).
On impact, the contractionary monetary policy shock produces an appreciation of
the exchange rate, as has been found elsewhere in the literature for other small and
open economies (Zettelmeyer [42]), and there is thus no evidence of an exchange-rate
puzzle in which a monetary tightening leads to an impact depreciation (Sims [37], Grilli
and Roubini [17]). The ensuing depreciation of the domestic currency, although not
significant at convetional significance levels, is consistent with the uncovered interest
parity condition (UIPC). Under this condition, an increase in domestic interest rates
relative to foreign interest rates should be followed after the impact appreciation by
a persistent depreciation of the domestic currency.25 As found by Kim and Roubini
[21] for major industrialized countries, the rapid reversal of the impact appreciation is
indeed evidence of no delayed overshooting and that the UIPC might hold. In other
words, there is no evidence of a forward discount bias puzzle (Eichenbaum and Evans
[16], Grilli and Roubini [17]).
It is also interesting to note that in both specifications the response of the central
bank’s net foreign assets holdings almost mimics the response of the demand for cur-
rency by the public. Even when it might be puzzling that a contractionary monetary
policy shock is followed one month later by an increased demand for local currency,
impulse response functions show very clearly that the monetary authority is constantly
accomodating to these changes. Thus, when the demand for domestic currency in-
creases, the central bank exchanges it for foreign currency, and vice versa. As a result
of this accomodative policy, the exchange rate barely moves through time, with only a
slight depreciation one quarter after the shock.
5.2.2 The response to current developments in the economy
Table 2 reports the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the parameters in
the monetary authority’s reaction functions (equations (15) and (18)). The most sur-
prising results are the ones related to the provision of foreign and domestic currencies by
the central bank. In both specifications the BCRA absorbs less than 3% of the current
account shocks. More striking is the finding that, albeit small, the response to capi-
tal and financial account shocks ranges from statistically insignificant in the SVAR(3)
specification to negative in the SVAR(2) specification. In other words, as far as the
contemporaneous response to shocks is concerned, the reaction function of the central
bank for the period under study does not resemble the one of a currency board.
The provision of liquidity through open market operations also yields interesting re-
sults. Estimates indicate that the Argentine central bank does not accommodate neither
to currency demand shocks by the public nor to liquidity shocks by commercial banks.
On the contrary, both specifications yield a significant and sizeable contemporaneous
accomodation of the BCRA to the results of its own intervention in the foreign exchange
market. The 95% confidence intervals suggest that the Argentine central bank is likely
25We sensibly assume that Argentina is an economy small enough so as not to affect foreign interest
rates, and so the latter can be assumed to remain constant. Kim and Roubini [21] find that only Japan
and Germany, among all non-U.S. G-7 countries, are large enough to affect world interest rates.
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to sterilize in a range from 5.8% to 65.3% its intervention in the foreign exchange market
within the same month. In the case of a positive current or capital account, this means
that the Argentine central bank systematically repurchases (in exchange for bonds) a
fraction of the monetary base it initially sold to accommodate to the demand for local
currency.
Table 2. Contemporaneous response to shocks
SVAR(2) SVAR(3)
Coef. 95% conf. int. Coef. 95% conf. int.
φca 0.0109 -0.0003 0.0221 0.0209∗ 0.0083 0.0335
φka −0.0199∗ -0.0321 -0.0078 −0.0120 -0.0247 0.0007
θ∆cp -0.0050 -0.0245 0.0145 -0.0106 -0.0294 0.0083
θ∆li 0.0002 -0.0207 0.0212 0.0055 -0.0134 0.0244
θ∆nfa 0.3376∗ 0.0578 0.6174 0.3884∗ 0.1235 0.6533
* statistically significant at the 5% level.
Besides looking at its contemporaneous accomodation to shocks, impulse response
functions allow us to assess the evolution of endogenous monetary policy-making through
time. As in the previous subsection, only estimated impulse-response functions of the
model with two lags will be discussed here. Figures 2 and 3 present the systemic
response to non-policy shocks. Estimates show that two to three months after a terms-
of-trade shock net foreign assets increase. The sharp improvement in the central bank’s
external position prevents the currency from appreciating and interest rates fall two
months after the impact. Interest rates might not fall initially due to the central bank’s
counter-cyclical open market operations the month following the shock, with BCRA
bonds increasing in a nearly significant way.
A supply shock causes net foreign assets to increase in the second and third months
after that shock takes place, a fact that might explain why the exchange rate does not
appreciate significantly. Overall, open market operations appear to be neutral when
facing this shock, which points to a pro-cyclical monetary stance, with interest rates
remaining broadly stable. Similarly, as a response to an inflationary shock net foreign
assets and central bank bonds are reduced, especially one month after the perturba-
tion. Again, the intuition suggests that without this type of response interbank interest
rates, which rise alongside the fall in commercial bank’s liquidity, would experience a
significant increase.
Dynamic response functions show that current account innovations are not absorbed
further than what Table 2 indicates for the month within the impact. However, an im-
portant remark is that all the responses of the system to current account shocks are
estimated very imprecisely. Given that the data do not provide evidence that current
account shocks significantly affect the system, this motivates looking for alternative
methodologies that enable the use of longer time series.
Responses to domestic currency demand innovations also appear to be subject to
substantial sampling uncertainty. This notwithstanding, there is evidence that the
BCRA accommodates to this shock by buying foreign currency, without sterilization,
although this does not prevent the appreciation of the Peso two months after the inno-
vation took place. More puzzling is the response of the BCRA to a liquidity demand
shock. One month after the shock the central bank issues additional bonds, putting
more pressure on the liquidity market. Only two months after the initial impulse the
19
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Figure 2: Systemic response to non-policy shocks
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Figure 3: Systemic response to non-policy shocks (continued)
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central bank eases the pressure by buying foreign currency, as the increased demand
for domestic liquidity produces a contemporaneous appreciation of the local currency.
Again, the stability of interest rates throughout this process may in fact reflect the
pervasive effects of sampling uncertainty. Finally, impulse response functions find no
significant response of the BCRA to capital account shocks, even when there is evidence
that interest rates rise within the first half of the year after the shock and the exchange
rate depreciates henceforth.
5.2.3 Overall assessment
It has been argued that a basic test that an identification strategy should pass is to
yield “reasonable” results. Indeed, Christiano et al. [9] propose to reject a particular
identification scheme if there is no coherent model that can account for its impulse
response functions. A broader, and epistemologically less debatable, interpretation of
the argument suggests that a particular identification strategy should be discarded if
its impulse response functions were at odds with basic intuitions regarding monetary
policy. That is, we should reject impulse response functions that are “inconsistent not
only with existing models but also with views that have been held by actual policy
makers for many decades – indeed, for over a century” (McCallum [26], p. 121, cit. in
Cushman and Zha [13], p. 435).
In this sense, the proposed identification strategy features many results that are
broadly supported by conventional economic wisdom. Terms of trade shocks induce
a temporary acceleration of output growth and inflation, particularly within the first
two months, a temporary (though not significant) improvement of the current account
one to three months after the shock, a significant increase in net foreign assets two
and three months after the shock, an increased demand for local currency, and an
appreciation of the domestic currency two to three months after the shock. Output
shocks, which are also subject to considerable inertia, imply a temporary reduction in
inflation, a deterioration of the current account during the month following the shock,
an improvement in the central bank’s external position only after the deterioration of
the current account, a rise in the demand for local currency two to three months after
the perturbation, and a temporary depreciation of the currency that is later followed
by an appreciation. The increase in interest rates due to the supply shock starts two
months after the impact, although it is statistically insignificant.
An inflationary shock increases output growth one and two months later, albeit in
a nonsignificant way. The improvement in the current account that follows this shock
occurs because the GDP deflator also incorporates exports prices, and with a greater
weight than imports prices. Additionally, the inflationary shock appears to have a
positive impact on nominal interest rates. The decreased demand for domestic currency
two months after the shock can be rationalized by agents adjusting their portfolios in
light of the effects of inertial inflation on real cash balances.
Also conforming with general beliefs, a current account shock results in a fall in
interest rates and an increased liquidity of commercial banks. Additionally, a positive
shock in the demand for domestic currency leads to a nearly significant deceleration of
inflation. The increased demand for local currency results in its appreciation vis-a`-vis
the U.S. dollar two months after the shock. As expected, a positive shock to the demand
for liquidity by commercial banks results in a fall in the amount of currency held by the
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public, and in the rise of the dollar value of the currency. Finally, a foreign-currency
supply shock operating through the capital and financial account leads to a temporary
acceleration of growth that is then reversed.26
Notwithstanding the compliance of the aforementioned responses to conventional
wisdom, some results turn out to be more puzzling. Less easy to rationalize is the
response of output growth to a current account shock. A foreign-currency supply shock
operating through the current account leads to a fall in GDP growth during the month
after the shock took place.27 Also puzzling is the response of some of the variables to
a capital account shock. In particular, it is somewhat difficult to explain that a capital
account shock simultaneously (i) increases terms of trade growth, (ii) increases interest
rates, and, a few months later, (iii) depreciates the currency.
Overall, however, the estimated model seems to fit relatively well generally accepted
views regarding the effects of non-policy shocks.
6 Concluding remarks
Identification of monetary policy shocks in open economies has been dealt with diverse
approaches, although without reaching a consensus about the dominant one. This paper
extended a popular identification strategy originally developed for the U.S. relatively
closed economy so that it could account for the simultaneity between interest rate and
exchange rate innovations present in any open economy. Moreover, the methodology
allows a separate treatment of two distinct monetary policy shocks, namely, the one
that operates through open market operations, and the one that takes place through
interventions in the foreign exchange market. In doing so, it attempts to disentangle
the pressures stemming from the markets for domestic and foreign liquidity from the
central bank’s response to these pressures.
The strategy is implemented to the Argentine economy over the period 2003-2008.
Although the methodology is subject to a number of long-standing (some often ne-
glected) critiques raised in the literature, the dynamic features of the estimated model
are broadly supported by conventional economic wisdom. Estimation results should
thus serve both to confront theoretical models against reality, and to shed light on the
way central banks operate in open economies.
Dynamic responses of the system to a typical, unexpected purchase of foreign cur-
rency indicate that the central bank issues bonds to absorb around one-third of the
domestic currency against which the foreign exchange intervention takes place. The
ensuing depreciation of the domestic currency provides evidence of a portfolio balance
channel. As a result of exchange rate pass-through, inflation jumps after the shock, and
the temporary increase in the rate of output growth can thus be thought in terms of
price misperception models. Finally, while the real interest rate initially falls, it starts
recovering around three months after the shock as nominal interest rates increase. On
the other hand, unexpected open market operations affect output growth with the ex-
pected sign, although it is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
26I will not focus on the response of the system to v∆oi shocks, as there are no conventional priors to
have in this regard.
27In the model with three lags, there is a significative bounce-back effect in the third month after the
impulse.
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The results also prove to be free of the empirical anomalies previously found in the
literature. There is no evidence of a liquidity puzzle; following a contractionary pol-
icy shock, interest rates rise. Moreover, the price puzzle is also absent; inflation does
not accelerate after the shock. Finally, the unexpected tightening produces an impact
appreciation of the domestic currency, and there are thus no signs of an exchange-rate
puzzle. Moreover, there is an ensuing depreciation of the domestic currency which shows
that there is no evidence of a forward discount bias puzzle.
Regarding the systematic component of monetary policy, this paper finds that,
notwithstanding the relative stability of the exchange rate and the accumulation of
large amounts of international reserves, the central bank in Argentina has been far from
absorbing balance of payments shocks in a currency-board fashion. The growing level
of international reserves can be rationalized, instead, as the monetary authority’s re-
sponse to shocks to the terms of trade, supply shocks, and innovations in the demand
for domestic currency, both by the public and by commercial banks.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix draws entirely from the identification theory by Rubio-Ramı´rez et
al. [31] (RWZ henceforth). It is beyond the scope of the present study to develop this
theory here. Thus, the reader is referred to RWZ to understand the procedure below. To
facilitate this task, this appendix adopts RWZ’s convention of writing the VAR model
with the endogenous variables as a row vector (see RWZ, p. 5, eq. (1)). Hence, matrices
A and B will appear transposed.
To apply the identification theory of RWZ, first it is necessary to drop the normaliza-
tions adopted in the previous sections. Second, we also need consider the identification
of those parameters that do not appear in matrix A or matrix B, namely the variances
of the structural shocks. If we assume that the structural shocks are not only orthogo-
nal, but also of unit variance, then we can accommodate matrix B to have unrestricted
coefficients where it had ones. For example, instead of being an identity matrix, B11
becomes:
B11 =
b11 0 00 b22 0
0 0 b33

so that, for instance, the variance of the terms of trade (which is ordered first) structural
shock is simply V AR(b11v˘11) = b211V AR(v˘11) = b
2
11, where v˘11 is the unit-variance
orthogonal terms of trade shock.
With these considerations taken into account, the function f(A0, A+) of transformed
structural parameters is the 20× 10 matrix that results from the vertical concatenation
of the non-normalized versions of A′ and B′:
f(A0, A+) =

a11 a21 a31 a41 a51 a61 a71 a81 a91 a10,1
0 a22 a32 a42 a52 a62 a72 a82 a92 a10,2
0 0 a33 a43 a53 a63 a73 a83 a93 a10,3
0 0 0 a44 −a55 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 a55 a65 0 0 −θ˜∆nfa a10,5
0 0 0 0 0 0 a76 0 0 −a10,5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a87 0 −a10,5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a98 −a10,5
0 0 0 0 −ρ˜ 0 γ˜ η˜ 0 0
0 0 0 −β˜ δ˜ 0 τ˜ −ω˜ 0 0
b11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 b33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 b44 0 φ˜ca 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 b65 0 0 0 ψ˜∆nfa
0 0 0 0 0 0 b76 0 θ˜∆cp ψ˜∆cp
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b87 θ˜∆li ψ˜∆li
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b98 ψ˜∆mp
0 0 0 0 b59 φ˜ka 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b10,10

(23)
The tilde above each structural parameter of equation (20) indicates that the pa-
rameter is not normalized.
There are ten 20×20 Qj matrices, one for the restrictions on each of the columns of
(23). Each matrix Qj is of rank qj . The policy block in section 3 has been constructed
so as to comply with RWZ’s ([31], p. 10) convention that qj ≥ qi if, and only if, j ≥ i.28
Since
∑
j qj = 140 ≥ 45 = k(k − 1)/2, the necessary condition for identification is met.
We can then proceed to construct the ten Mj(f(A0, A+)) matrices (see RWZ [31],
p. 14). Since there exist values for the elements in (23) such that Mj has rank k = 10
for j = 1, . . . , 10, we have that the model is globally identified almost everywhere in the
structural parameter space where the identifying restrictions are satisfied.
The Maxima code with the entire set of rank checks is available from the author
upon request.
APPENDIX B
National accounts statistics and terms of trade data are released on a quarterly
basis by INDEC. Instead of turning to monthly indicators such as the overall activity
index in the case of economic activity and the CPI in the case of the price level, here the
choice was the interpolation of quarterly variables, whose impulse response functions
are more easily interpretable.29
Interpolation is through state space methods. Let yt be the monthly unobservable
variable (e.g., monthly GDP) we want to recover from the data, and consider a set of s
related series that are believed to provide information of within quarter movements of
the series to be recovered. Defining then the state vector as ξt = (yt yt−1 yt−2)′, our
state equation becomes:
ξt+1 = d+ Fξt +Gxt+1 +wt+1 (24)
where d is a 3× 1 vector, F is a 3× 3 matrix, G is a 3× s matrix, xt is a s× 1 vector
of stacked related series, and wt is a vector of disturbances. Under the hypothesis that
the monthly series follows a random walk process,30 F is simply:
F =
1 0 01 0 0
0 1 0

so that the first row in equation (24) becomes
yt+1 = d1 + yt + g11x1,t+1 + · · ·+ g1sxs,t+1 + w1,t+1 (25)
28We have that q1 = 18, q2 = 17, q3 = 16, q4 = 14, q5 = q6 = q7 = q8 = 13, q9 = 12, q10 = 11.
29Bernanke, Gertler and Watson [4] and Bernanke and Mihov [6] are among the authors that rely on
interpolated data obtained using a similar procedure than in the present study. Leeper, Sims and Zha
[24], among others, use the Chow-Lin procedure. Other authors, on the other hand, simply use monthly
available indicators. For instance, in order to check the robustness of their results, Christiano at al.
[9] replace aggregate output with nonfarm payroll employment and the GDP deflator with the implicit
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. Since January 2007 several monthly indexes produced
by INDEC have been widely contested by private analysts, providing an additional reason to avoid the
use of monthly indicators.
30The null of unit root could not be rejected in any of the quarterly series. Since the low power of the
unit root tests might have severe implications for the short samples used (63 observations), interpolation
was also done without imposing that the AR coefficient be equal to one. Results proved to be unsensitive
to this modification.
allowing for the possibility of the monthly series to have a drift (i.e., d1 is not restricted
to zero). The second and third rows in equation (24) are mere identities, so that d, G
and wt+1 are:
d =
d10
0

G =
g11 g12 · · · g1s0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0

wt+1 =
w1,t+10
0

Each three months we observe a signal yt of what happened within quarter, e.g.,
the quarterly GDP. The signal equation thus becomes the following simple average
constraint:
yt = h
′ξt (26)
where h = (1/3 1/3 1/3)′.31
Assuming that the disturbance w1,t+1 has a standard normal distribution, param-
eters are estimated by maximum likelihood. The sample goes from 1993:1 through
2008:9. Once the model (24)-(26) has been estimated, the state series is recovered by
moment smoothing.
For the GDP, s = 2, with the “Indice General de Actividad” (IGA) from OJ Fer-
reres & Asociados and the “Indice de Produccio´n Industrial” (IPI) from FIEL as related
series. For the GDP deflator no related series were used. Finally, for the terms of trade
s = 5, relying on the monthly average crude oil price, the average hard red winter wheat
price, the average soybeans price, the average corn price, and the chapter of industrial
commodities of the U.S. producer price index. The data source for terms of trade re-
lated series is World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor. Interpolated monthly series are
available from the author upon request.
APPENDIX C
Table 3 displays the standard statistics for lag order selection. The Akaike statistic
suggests the use of three lags. With a larger penalization for lack of parsimony than
the AIC, the Hannan-Quinn and the Schwarz criteria suggest the use of the model with
only one lag.32 Based on the LR test, on the other hand, it is possible to reject the
31Note that we have worked with this average constraint for all three series (GDP, GDP deflator and
terms of trade). It could be argued that for the GDP, the add-up constraint that results from setting
h = (1 1 1)′ is more appropriate. I chose to work with the average constraint because it complies
with the fact that quarterly GDP figures released by INDEC are annualized. Additionally, the average
constraint makes the interpolated series easier to interpret for those who are familiar with Argentine
GDP data.
32More specifically, let k be the number of parameters to be estimated and T denote the sample size.
The penalization is equal to 2k/T , 2k · ln(ln(T ))/T and k · ln(T )/T for the AIC, the HQIC and the
SBIC, respectively. With 66 observations, the penalization factor for each additional parameter is of
0.0303, 0.0434 and 0.0635 for the AIC, the HQIC and the SBIC, respectively.
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Figure 4: Variables included in the model
hypothesis that the parameters associated with the second and third lags are jointly
zero.33
Table 3. Lag length selection criteria
Lag AIC HQIC SBIC LR
0 -34.04 -33.91 -33.7
1 -39.79 −38.31∗ −36.04∗ 562.0
2 -40.98 -38.17 -33.84 275.3
3 −41.19∗ -37.05 -30.65 213.5∗
* indicates optimal lag order.
In section 3 v∆nfa and v∆mp were the monetary policy shocks we want to be identi-
fied. As such, they reflect changes in the “personalities” involved in the decision process
of the Central Bank, political factors, errors made by the policy makers in the measure-
ment of current economic conditions, etc. However, it is necessary to recognize the
possibility that the identified shocks partially reflect misspecification (Eichenbaum and
Evans [16]). In light of this consideration, I follow Bagliano and Favero’s [2] sensible
procedure of performing a number of specification tests on the reduced form VAR, which
is always consistently estimated equation-by-equation using OLS.
Moreover, insofar as the standard statistics for order selection yield ambiguous re-
sults, it is worth testing whether the different models comply with the assumptions
regarding the vector of reduced VAR residuals ut. First, it is important to see if with
only one lag the assumption of no serial autocorrelation is not rejected. As it can
be readily seen in Table 4, at conventional significance levels (5% or 10%) the speci-
fication with two lags outperforms the other two specifications in terms of absence of
autocorrelation.
Table 4. LM autocorrelation test (p-values)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
VAR(1) 0.00 0.53 0.44 0.73 0.68 0.16 0.12 0.45 0.59 0.87 0.24 0.23
VAR(2) 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.83 0.54 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.93 0.45 0.66
VAR(3) 0.14 0.44 0.04 0.19 0.78 0.04 0.21 0.50 0.64 0.99 0.19 0.14
As a second step, we proceed to investigate if the residuals of the alternative speci-
fications could be considered to be normally distributed. The second column in Table 5
shows substantial departures from normality in the VAR(1) model. On the other hand,
the VAR(2) specification performs better than the VAR(3). With two lags, normality
of the residuals of the equation for ∆cp can be rejected at a 5% level, but not at a 1%
level (p-value of 0.0196).
Table 5. Normality test χ2
VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(3)
utot 4.66 0.37 2.28
ug 10.41∗ 3.57 0.28
up 13.07∗ 2.43 0.78
uca 0.69 0.49 0.11
33The LR statistic has been adjusted to account for small-sample bias (see Sims [36], pp. 17-8).
This is easily achieved by multiplying the large-sample statistic by T−k
T
, where T is the number of
observations and k is the number of estimated parameters per equation.
VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(3)
u∆nfa 6.53∗ 1.39 5.23∗
u∆cp 9.29∗ 7.87∗ 16.10∗
u∆li 0.27 0.06 2.00
u∆mp 1.95 2.80 0.39
uir 5.00 2.45 1.23
uer 0.50 0.66 0.31
* indicates rejection of normality at the 5% level.
Finally, we test if the maintained assumption of homoskedasticity of the VAR resid-
uals could be rejected. Table 6 shows the resulting p-values of performing Engle’s LM
test of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH), where the null hypothesis
of no ARCH effects is tested against the alternative of ARCH effects of order p. There
are clear signs of heteroskedasticity in the VAR(1) residuals of the equations of tot,
g, er, and, to a smaller extent, p and ∆mp. With the exception of the alternative of
ARCH(3) effects in tot for the case of the VAR(2), in the other two specifications it is
not possible to reject the null at a 5% significance level.
Table 6. ARCH test χ2(p) for different p’s (p-values)
1 2 3 4 5 6
VAR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
utot VAR(2) 0.71 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.07
VAR(3) 0.89 0.44 0.43 0.27 0.40 0.49
VAR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ug VAR(2) 0.07 0.23 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.25
VAR(3) 0.35 0.53 0.46 0.63 0.59 0.39
VAR(1) 0.01 0.41 0.57 0.10 0.09 0.14
up VAR(2) 0.37 0.61 0.66 0.76 0.79 0.87
VAR(3) 0.11 0.22 0.36 0.39 0.51 0.50
VAR(1) 0.90 0.88 0.79 0.58 0.76 0.70
uca VAR(2) 0.84 0.98 0.67 0.74 0.53 0.33
VAR(3) 0.63 0.63 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.52
VAR(1) 0.39 0.47 0.82 0.74 0.83 0.57
u∆nfa VAR(2) 0.47 0.35 0.53 0.33 0.28 0.24
VAR(3) 0.64 0.76 0.64 0.80 0.89 0.84
VAR(1) 0.25 0.50 0.69 0.78 0.78 0.91
u∆cp VAR(2) 0.07 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.39 0.67
VAR(3) 0.40 0.63 0.42 0.47 0.61 0.71
VAR(1) 0.68 0.69 0.77 0.87 0.81 0.98
u∆li VAR(2) 0.80 0.66 0.88 0.77 0.93 0.95
VAR(3) 0.65 0.80 0.84 0.95 0.94 0.96
VAR(1) 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.08 0.07
u∆mp VAR(2) 0.84 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.44 0.58
VAR(3) 0.83 0.13 0.24 0.28 0.44 0.44
VAR(1) 0.83 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.90
uir VAR(2) 0.71 0.76 0.88 0.96 0.99 0.98
VAR(3) 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.18
VAR(1) 0.16 0.19 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.02
uer VAR(2) 0.87 0.99 0.94 0.78 0.88 0.88
VAR(3) 0.21 0.37 0.52 0.35 0.44 0.46
Tables 7 and 8 display the correlation matrices of the residuals of the VAR(2) and
VAR(3) specifications, respectively.34 There are two important features to note from
the observation of these matrices. First, the fact that several off-diagonal elements are
very large in absolute value underscores the importance of the task of identification.
Second, since in most cases correlations do not differ significantly across specifications,
it should not be surprising to find that both yield qualitatively similar results.
Table 7. Correlations of VAR(2) residuals
utot ug up uca u∆nfa u∆cp u∆li u∆mp uir uer
utot 1.00
ug 0.20 1.00
up 0.21 -0.34 1.00
uca -0.10 -0.16 -0.11 1.00
u∆nfa -0.09 0.22 -0.27 0.33 1.00
u∆cp -0.05 0.12 -0.07 -0.07 0.21 1.00
u∆li -0.17 -0.09 -0.26 0.15 0.13 -0.42 1.00
u∆mp -0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.13 0.23 -0.12 0.05 1.00
uir 0.05 -0.05 -0.19 -0.14 -0.20 0.22 -0.22 -0.36 1.00
uer 0.08 0.21 -0.11 -0.07 0.09 0.39 -0.29 -0.14 0.19 1.00
Table 8. Correlations of VAR(3) residuals
utot ug up uca u∆nfa u∆cp u∆li u∆mp uir uer
utot 1.00
ug 0.28 1.00
up 0.23 -0.41 1.00
uca -0.01 -0.22 0.01 1.00
u∆nfa -0.15 0.10 -0.24 0.43 1.00
u∆cp -0.13 0.13 -0.16 0.00 0.16 1.00
u∆li -0.22 -0.08 -0.25 0.10 0.17 -0.29 1.00
u∆mp -0.01 -0.12 0.11 -0.04 0.11 -0.20 0.05 1.00
uir 0.10 -0.01 -0.47 0.03 -0.10 0.12 0.09 -0.33 1.00
uer 0.05 0.23 -0.04 0.01 0.13 0.48 -0.34 -0.20 0.17 1.00
34Covariance matrices are estimated using a small-sample adjustment, where 1/(T − m¯) is used
instead of 1/T , being m¯ the average number of parameters across the different equations of the VAR.
This adjustment becomes relevant when estimating the structural parameters, as the covariance matrix
is an argument of the likelihood function.
